

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 240009

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TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 240009

EXDIS ,TOSEC 444

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EC

SUBJECT: CUBA SANCTIONS - TROUBLED OUTLOOK FOR QUITO

REF: (A) STATE 236997 (B) NEW DELHI 14456

FROM ACTING SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

1. A PROBABLE REVERSAL OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMITMENT HAS  
NOW APPARENTLY DEPRIVED CO-SPONSORS OF THE 14TH VOTE  
NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY REQUIRED  
PER THE LETTER OF THE RIO TREATY.

2. THE VOTING LINEUP, BARRING DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL SOMEWHERE  
OR PROVOCATIVE ACT BY CASTRO, NOW APPEARS TO BE AS  
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PAGE 02 STATE 240009

FOLLOWS:

A. COMMITTED TO LIFTING SANCTIONS: ELEVEN COUNTRIES:  
ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR,  
HONDURAS, MEXICO, PANAMA, PERU, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND  
VENEZUELA.

B. VERY PROBABLE (COMMITTED BUT WITH A TINGE OF  
UNCERTAINTY): TWO COUNTRIES: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND  
HAITI, MAKING LIKELY TOTAL OF 13 VOTES FOR RESOLUTION.

C. SWING VOTES, NOW IN THE ABSTAIN COLUMN: BOLIVIA,  
GUATEMALA, AND NICARAGUA. BOLIVIA AND NICARAGUA CLEARLY  
LOOK TO THE U.S. FOR A LEAD. GUATEMALA IS MORE INDEPENDENT  
MINDED BUT WANTS OUR VIEWS. GUATEMALAN FOREIGN  
MINISTER MOLINA WANTS TO LIFT SANCTIONS, IN INTERESTS  
OF RIO TREATY AND INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, BUT HIS PRESIDENT,  
BECAUSE OF RIGHT WING POLITICAL CRITICISM, HAS  
REVERSED THAT COMMITMENT, AT LEAST TENTATIVELY.

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT HAS BECOME RATHER MORE  
LIKELY THAT QUITO WILL RESULT IN A LEGALLY INCONCLUSIVE  
OUTCOME, WITH THE CO-SPONSORS KEEPING THEIR ABSOLUTE  
MAJORITY BUT FALLING SLIGHTLY SHORT OF THE REQUIRED  
14 VOTES. IF THE MAJORITY WILL IS THUS BLOCKED, THE  
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES COULD BE VERY SERIOUS, PARTICULARLY  
AS THERE WILL BE A TENDENCY TO BLAME THE U.S. FOR THIS  
OUTCOME. (SEE REPORT OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER  
VIGNES' CONVERSATION WITH BOWDLER SENT TOSEC 391.) VENEZUELA  
AND COLOMBIA WILL LIKELY MOVE TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITH  
CUBA ANYWAY, BUT THEY WILL ALSO RESENT OUR HAVING PERSUADED  
THEM TO DELAY AND TO GO THE OAS ROAD IN VAIN.  
DISCREDITING OF RIO TREATY MAY LOOSEN RESTRAINTS AGAINST  
ADVENTURISM ALONG DISPUTED BORDERS (E.G. CHILE/PERU,  
SALVADOR/HONDURAS). MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE DAMAGE TO  
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS WILL HAVE SPILL-OVER EFFECTS  
ON THE NEW DIALOGUE AND STIMULATE TENDENCIES TO REPLACE  
INTER-AMERICAN LINKAGES WITH WHOLLY LATIN GROUPINGS,  
FROM WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BE EXCLUDED.

4. WE HAVE SET THIS FORTH WITHOUT TRYING TO ESTIMATE  
DEGREES OF DAMAGE. BUT THE NATURE OF THIS QTE WE-THEY  
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PAGE 03 STATE 240009

UNQTE RELATIONSHIP PUTS US IN THE POSITION WHERE QTE THEY  
UNQTE ARE GOING TO THINK THAT QTE WE UNQTE DONT CARE  
ABOUT THE INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.

5. IN VIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCES IF QUITO BECOMES A  
FAILURE AND AN EMBARRASSMENT, WE PUT FORTH SOME  
ALTERNATIVES, WHICH DO NOT REPEAT NOT INCLUDE A FAVORABLE  
U.S. VOTE:

A. TRY DISCREETLY TO ASSURE ENOUGH VOTES FOR A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY, EVEN THOUGH WE CANNOT VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION, THROUGH SELECTED APPROACHES TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES, PRINCIPALLY THE SWING VOTES. (THIS COULD FAIL, SINCE COUNTRIES MAY BE UNWILLING TO DO AS WE SAY AND NOT AS WE DO, AND LEAKS COULD BE DAMAGING, ALTHOUGH DEFENSIBLE ON GROUNDS THAT WE ARE TRYING TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE RESPONSIVE TO MAJORITY WILL.)

B. CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING, AT QUITO, A

DECISION ON THE ISSUE. (POSTPONEMENT OF THE MEETING ITSELF SEEMS NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE; ECUADOR IS ALL GEARED UP AND RIDICULE WOULD ATTEND POSTPONEMENT.) BUT IF IT BECAME APPARENT QUITO WOULD BE A DEBACLE, IT IS REMOTELY POSSIBLE THE LATINS MIGHT WISH, AFTER DEBATE, TO POSTPONE THE DECISION. HOWEVER, SOME LATINS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INSIST ON A VOTE.

C. WHEN WE GET TO QUITO, AND IF THE OUTCOME STILL LOOKS INCONCLUSIVE, EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR JURIDICAL LEGERDEMAIN, PERHAPS USING OUR AUTHORITY TO AGREE TO CHANGES IN THE RIO TREATY VOTING PROCEDURES TO SPARK A PRELIMINARY VOTE, BY TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY, THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IN THIS INSTANCE SHOULD BE BY MAJORITY VOTE. WE WOULD VOTE IN FAVOR ON THE FIRST VOTE, ABSTAIN ON THE SECOND VOTE. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE TRICKY AND MIGHT FACE COMPETITION FROM AN UNWELCOME RESURRECTION OF FACIO'S QTE REVERSE TWO-THIRDS UNQTE FORMULA OF LAST YEAR. (A PROCEDURAL MANEUVER SETTING UP A SITUATION WHERE THE VOTE IS ON THE ISSUE OF RETAINING-- RATHER THAN LIFTING--SANCTIONS AND WHERE TWO-THIRDS

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PAGE 04 STATE 240009

WOULD THEN, BY THIS INTERPRETATION, BE REQUIRED TO KEEP THEM ON.)

6. IF YOU AGREE, WE WOULD PROPOSE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE A, TRYING TO ASSURE A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. EVEN IF WE FAIL, THIS EFFORT MAY DEFLECT SOME OF THE RANCOR DIRECTED AT US AND THEREBY LESSEN SOMEWHAT THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF AN INCONCLUSIVE OUTCOME. WE WOULD PROPOSE DISCREET APPROACHES, TAILORED TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND PERSONALITIES, AS FOLLOWS:

A. CABLE OUR AMBASSADORS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI, ASKING THEM TO APPROACH THE PRESIDENTS (WHO MAKE ALL THE DECISIONS THERE) TO CONFIRM THEY ARE STILL COMMITTED TO VOTING FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS, AND SAYING

THAT WE UNDERSTAND THEIR REASONS FOR DOING SO.

B. A PERSONAL APPROACH TO NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR SEVILLA-SACASA, AS THE BEST ROUTE TO PRESIDENT SOMOZA, SAYING THAT WHILE WE WILL LIKELY ABSTAIN, BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL SYMBOLISM THAT ATTACHES TO THE U.S. VOTE, NONE-THELESS WE SEE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE TO HAVING THE SANCTIONS LIFTED BEFORE THIS DIVISIVE ISSUE PERMANENTLY DAMAGES THE FABRIC OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM. SEVILLA HAS HINTED TO US THAT NICARAGUA MIGHT VOTE FOR, ALTHOUGH THE CONTEXT CLEARLY WAS THAT OF FOLLOWING THE U.S. NONETHELESS, IT WOULDN'T HURT NICARAGUA'S IMAGE TO BE ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF A VOTE FROM THE U.S.

C. AN APPROACH TO BOLIVIA, VIA CABLE, AND TO GUATEMALA, EITHER BY CABLE OR THROUGH PERSONAL CONTACTS, SAYING THAT WE WILL LIKELY ABSTAIN, BUT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DAMAGE TO THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IF RESULTS ARE INCONCLUSIVE. WE KNOW THEY SHARE OUR CONCERNS, AND HOPE THEY WILL WEIGH THEIR INTERESTS CAREFULLY IN DECIDING HOW TO VOTE. WE WOULD STRESS BOLIVIA'S PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE RIO TREATY AS AN ELEMENT OF SECURITY WITH HER NEIGHBORS, FROM WHOM SHE FEELS FAR FROM SECURE.

7. THIS WOULD SCRAP THE APPROACH SUGGESTED IN REF A.  
WE WOULD OF COURSE TELL THE BRAZILIANS EXACTLY WHAT WE  
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PAGE 05 STATE 240009

ARE UP TO BEFORE EMBARKING ON THIS COURSE. REQUEST  
YOUR GUIDANCE. INGERSOLL

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